Sexual Abuse at Charity House: A Case Study of Social Policies in Action by Kelleher, Maureen
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 14
Issue 4 December Article 6
December 1987
Sexual Abuse at Charity House: A Case Study of
Social Policies in Action
Maureen Kelleher
Northeastern University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Policy Commons, and the Social Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact
maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kelleher, Maureen (1987) "Sexual Abuse at Charity House: A Case Study of Social Policies in Action," The Journal of Sociology & Social
Welfare: Vol. 14 : Iss. 4 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol14/iss4/6
SEXUAL ABUSE AT CHARITY HOUSE:
A CASE STUDY OF SOCIAL
POLICIES IN ACTION
MAUREEN KELLEHER
Northeastern University
This paper explores Wiseman's theory of policy intervention using a case
study of institutional abuse for illustration. Social policy intervention is
an ongoing process. In this case, a single policy agenda, deinstitu-
tionalization, was modified by a variety of stakeholders and compounded
by a series of other child specific policy agenda including child abuse
reporting procedures.
The success or failure of social policy is usually judged on
the social impact which that intervention achieves. Policy eval-
uation also often assesses how close the final outcome of the
intervention is to the official intention of the policy. While
some degree of focus on the final outcome of intervention
seems valid, indeed critical, Wiseman (1979) has cautioned that
to focus exclusively on the end state misunderstands the de-
gree to which social policy intervention is an ongoing process
of change.
The opportunity to develop a theory of policy intervention
expands when such intervention is viewed as a process. Re-
searchers can track how abstract goals are translated into spe-
cific policies, practices, and procedures. The role of various
stakeholders in the social policy-including policy target
groups and those responsible for day-to-day implementation of
that policy-and their wide variety of strategic reactions rang-
ing from adjustment and acceptance to circumvention, subver-
sion, and open rebellion can be evaluated. And finally, the role
of social engineers who may monitor the response to their pol-
icies either regularly or in reaction to occasional, severe crises
can be assessed.
This paper relies on a case study to test the thesis that is
implied in Wiseman's formulation of a tentative theory of social
policy; that is, it is the quality of the change process no less
than the quality of the official purpose of the intervention that
determines the efficacy of the social intervention. Thus, a pol-
icy which may be judged a failure along some specified criteria
by virtue of the achieved impact may owe its shortcomings as
much, if not more, to the process of intervention as to the
efficacy of the policy itself.
THE CASE STUDY
The decision to close Charity House (a pseudonym), a
group care facility for children, may be viewed as a failure of
social policy intervention: in this case, the social policy of de-
institutionalization. When Charity House's host state adopted
a policy of moving children from state sponsored institutions in
the early 1970s, the sponsors of that change had some clear
official goals in mind:
1. The developmental needs of children were not being
met adequately in existing institutions.
2. Moving this target population into a deinstitutionalized
setting would help control the spiralling costs of institu-
tionalized care (Scull, 1977).
3. The smaller deinstitutionalized setting would allow the
opportunity for the creation of a home-like environ-
ment, and for the utilization of small group therapy.
4. Many of the inherent negative outcomes of institu-
tionalization-from labeling and stigmatizing to vio-
lence and abuse-might be avoided.
Charity House, a Nineteenth Century church-sponsored
orphanage, became a conduit for the implementation of the
policy of deinstitutionalization. A number of important chang-
es were undertaken by Charity House as a way of adjusting to
this new policy thrust. Most particularly, the program moved
toward a less restrictive model of care with major modifications
in the number of children treated and the types of living ar-
rangements that were made (Kadushin, 1980).
A widely publicized incident of child abuse in the early
1980's invited intense investigation of day-to-day program op-
erations both by the state agency purchasing services and the
parent church. The state sent in an evaluation team made up of
two state-employed social workers and an applied sociologist
(the author) hired from the outside to act as the senior member.
The team report assessed day-to-day program issues and con-
cluded that significant goals of deinstitutionalization had gone
unfulfilled at Charity House. In response, state social workers
gradually reduced the number of children referred to Charity
House, and the church announced its decision to close the
facility entirely.
The data gathering process followed by the state team ad-
hered to what Patton (1978) calls "utilization-focused evalua-
tion" and Payne (1981) has termed a "critical appraisal" model.
This process focuses on helping the institution improve day-to-
day program practices. During the evaluation, interviews were
held with the program administrator. The evaluation team also
toured the facility, interviewed staff members, attended staff
meetings, and reviewed records and other pertinent material
including daily logs recording both youth and cottage ac-
tivities. A state report summarized the findings of the team.
Once the evaluation process was completed, interviews were
conducted with the other team members (both social workers)
and state agency administrators to provide additional insight
into the process. Finally, local news coverage of the child abuse
incident was tracked in order to assess how the event was
presented to the general public and the impact of negative
publicity on the day-to-day operations of the program.
The Charity House story might be viewed as an example of
the "failure" of social policy intervention. However, careful
examination of the process of change rather than of the final
outcome alone illuminates substantially the dynamics that led
to the closing of Charity House. Since social policies are not
created in a vacuum, they must, in Wiseman's words, "sup-
port, deal with, or deflect" (1979: 7) myriad other social and
environmental forces, not the least of which are other social
policies which must co-exist within the same environment. To
develop the main thesis of this paper concerning the interre-
lationship between the process of change and the resulting end
state of that change, I examine the process of policy interven-
tion and implementation at Charity House. More generally, I
argue that the methodology of conducting case studies of
policy intervention at the day-to-day implementation level pro-
vides an irreplaceable tool for achieving a systematic under-
standing of the interrelationship between process and out-
comes.
CHARITY HOUSE: POLICY IN PRACTICE
Charity House was founded in the mid-1800s as a home for
orphans. As such, Charity House's foundation rests on the
child saving movement of the mid-nineteenth century and its
unique brand of denominationalism, hard work, and lack of
individualized treatment (Platt, 1969; Costin, 1984).
In the early 1950s, Charity House relocated in the suburbs.
The physical plant, by 1950s standards, was spacious and mod-
ern: primarily one story with a main central area which housed
offices, a chapel, meeting rooms, and a main kitchen. A long
corridor led from the front of the facility to the rear portion,
which had a series of ten residential wings that could house up
to 120 children. There was a separate school located on the
grounds for both residents and day students.
Therapeutic expectations for out-of-home care began to
shift dramatically in the 1960s. Project Head Start, Title XX of
the Social Security Act, amendments in AFDC legislation, the
passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 1974, and the implementation of the Child Abuse and Pre-
vention Act all emerged out of concern for children's develop-
mental needs (Jansson, 1984). These policy decisions were at
least in part based on ecological assumptions that attempt to
recognize the environmental influences that affect children
(VanderVen, 1981).
As part of this dramatic shift in the area of policies toward
children, political liberals and welfare professionals with op-
timistic assumptions about the efficacy of the therapeutic mi-
lieu initiated a movement that eventually culminated in the
deinstitutionalization of children who previously had been as-
signed to state facilities, and the placement of many of those
children in relatively smaller, community based, and privately
run centers (Kadushin, 1980). This move toward deinstitu-
tionalization spurred policy shifts intended to support the un-
derlying assumption of deinstitutionalization; namely, that
children should be treated in ways significantly different from
traditional treatment methods, some of which dated back to the
inception of children's reformatories in the late 1800s (Platt,
1969; Gould, 1976).
The policy of deinstitutionalization appealed to a broad
and diverse constituency. To fiscal conservatives, for instance,
deinstitutionalization held out the promise of controlling the
spiralling costs of institutionalized care (Scull, 1977). To advo-
cates of therapy within small group settings, deinstitutionaliza-
tion opened the door for the dramatic growth of their preferred
therapeutic milieu. And for those with more open-ended hu-
manitarian concerns, deinstitutionalization guaranteed the
closing of facilities built in the 1800s with their general ware-
housing of children, and offered the chance for children to be
treated in home-like settings.
Another important aspect of the environmental context
that produced deinstitutionalization was the growing the-
oretical and ideological skepticism toward traditional modes of
therapeutic care. Goffman's seminal works of Asylums (1961)
and Stigma (1963) together with the emergence of the popu-
larity of labeling theory as discussed by Becker (1963), Scheff
(1966), Lemert (1951) and others helped to portray institutional
life and its victims as well as the responsibility of a type of
societal response which resulted in the label of deviance. The
negative labeling inherent in the process of institutionalizing
patients became of significant concern.
While sociologists analyzed the impact of the treating in-
stitutions, psychiatrists like Szasz (1961) offered a radical cri-
tique of the treatment itself; accusing psychiatric professionals
of inventing diseases that more rightly could be called "prob-
lems in living." Treatment of such problems, these critics rea-
soned, might best take place within an educational setting
rather than institutions for the mentally ill.
Deinstitutionalization marked a significant change from
traditional models of social control (see Scull, 1977). Especially
for children, who sometimes were institutionalized because
they were victims of negative family dynamics or guilty of
minor infractions of the juvenile justice code, deinstitu-
tionalization marked a dramatic departure in the model of care.
This model was given major support by Goldstein, et al.'s
(1973) advocacy of "the least detrimental alternative" as op-
posed to the "best interests of the child" model of intervention.
Their work forced practitioners to understand the limits of in-
tervention. Together with the rise of the fragmented but vocal
movement for children's rights in the 1960s, the support for
deinstitutionalization grew (Margolin, 1978).
Finally, the argument for deinstitutionalization struck an
ideological note. Rains (1984) argues, for instance, that twen-
tieth century reforms for juvenile delinquents have been
spurred by the belief that children should be placed in family as
opposed to institutional settings. This argument held all the
more so for non-delinquent children. And while the rehabilita-
tion literature does not overwhelmingly point to the superiority
of alternative settings, from an ideological perspective the pro-
cess of normalization and the use of less-restrictive settings are
viewed as clearly advantageous (Kadushin, 1980).
THE TURBULENT ENVIRONMENT
In the community-based care model, private vendors
emerged to fill the growing placement needs of the state after
deinstitutionalization. State agencies engaged in a purchase-of-
service relationship with these private vendors. The assump-
tion behind this approach was that the state would be in a
position to choose selectively the best program based on the
individual treatment needs of the child and foster a healthy
competition among vendors for the provision of quality care
(Costin and Rapp, 1984).
Permanency Planning and Accountability
The political environment that had supported and created
the deinstitutionalization movement did not remain static. The
idealistic optimism of advocates for deinstitutionalization
changed to a mood of critical reflection during the 1980s. While
stories of children languishing in institutions had helped to spur
the movement for deinstitutionalization, stories of children lan-
guishing in group care homes helped to spur the movement of
permanency planning. Permanency planning stipulated that
any out-of-home placement should be a temporary measure and
that a child's roots were with his/her biological or potentially
adoptive parents. The policy was compatible with the "least
detrimental alternative" model (Goldstein et. al., 1973)
This commitment to permanency planning, together with
emerging concerns with the issue of accountability in pur-
chased services came to a head in the early 1980s with state-
based movements to reduce taxes, thus curtailing money for
human services (and other public services). The "taxpayers'
revolt" of the early 1980s, with its emphasis on fiscal account-
ability and efficiency, forced state agencies into a position of
finally asking private vendors what the state was getting for its
money in terms of quality of care. Up until then, very little
monitoring and evaluation of services had occurred.
Even though Charity House's host state was committed to
deinstitutionalization and other related policies, institutions for
children still existed. The state had closed its own training
schools for delinquents. And a number of large private institu-
tions (like Charity House) had modernized or modified their
physical plants in an attempt to make them more home-like
and altered their therapeutic goals in part by taking fewer chil-
dren. Nonetheless, these latter facilities still existed and a phra-
se in the therapeutic community was developed to describe
such a modified program-a deinstitutionahzed institution
(Kadushin, 1980).
Child Abuse Policy
Violence and abuse have long been an integral, even inev-
itable part of institutional life (Goffman, 1961; Platt, 1969; Roth-
man, 1971; Sykes, 1971; and Wooden, 1976). Awareness of the
issue, particularly as it related to children, rose dramatically in
the 1970s with the spreading use of pediatric radiology and the
concomitant discovery of the "battered child syndrome" (Kem-
pe et. al., 1962), leading to the adoption of nationwide child
abuse reporting procedures (Phohl, 1977). Theorists focused
concern further by defining abuse as either physical or emo-
tional acts of commission (Bourne, 1979), or by understanding
abuse as the result of the interaction between individual pa-
thology and socio-cultural, ecological phenomena (Zigler,
1979).
In general, the policy response involved a series of state
mandated reporting and investigation procedures, commit-
ment to secondary prevention, or after-the-incident prevention
(Zigler, 1979). However, an awareness that it is necessary to
change an abusive ecology to intervene effectively in instances
of abuse (Newberger, 1979), moved some state agencies be-
yond after-the-fact intervention. When the abuse took place
within an alternative setting such as a group home or a de-
institutionalized institution, the host state choose to move to-
ward an evaluation of the ecology of that setting, a step toward
primary prevention (Zigler, 1979).
THE CHARITY HOUSE RESPONSE
In the 1970s, with the adoption of both the philosophy of
deinstitutionalization and the purchase-of-service system,
Charity House became a private vendor for the state. The
wings of the plant were called "cottages". Fewer religious staff
worked in the facility and more lay staff took over pivotal roles.
Charity House began to change into a deinstitutionalized in-
stitution. The program moved toward a less restrictive model
of care with major modifications in the number of children
treated and the type of living arrangements that were made.
Perhaps the most critical change, because of its history of
being an orphanage, was the need to re-orient its therapeutic
thrust. The policy of permanency planning clashed dramat-
ically with Charity House's traditional "orphanage mentality."
Essentially, Charity House now had to adopt a model of care
which emphasized short-term, quality intervention as opposed
to their past orientation of raising children until young
adulthood and thus working out problems over a long period
of time. The model of providing as little state intervention as
possible for children clashed with Charity House's past model
for long-term intervention.
Two key factors-the necessity of supporting a large in-
stitutional setting, and a state policy direction that called for
minimal intervention-combined to create another critical
problem for Charity House: empty beds. The combination of
the deinstitutionalization model together with permanency
planning (and tighter state budgets) led to the overall place-
ment of fewer children in care and for shorter periods of time.
In response, Charity House administrators closed cottage after
cottage. In order to keep the program viable, the administra-
tion began to branch out and provide a number of new services
including a pre-school program and a weekend treatment pro-
gram. The administration even rented out a wing to members
of a religious order who worked at another children's program
but slept at Charity House. This constant juggling of services,
together with the ever-increasing operating costs of the pro-
gram created tension and strain among the staff. At the same
time that internal issues were becoming problematic, the pro-
file of children placed in care by the state was changing. Ac-
cording to staff estimates, approximately half of the children at
Charity had a history of being sexually abused prior to admis-
sion to the program. And the majority of the 65 residents at
Charity in the early 1980s had been removed from their homes
because of abusive or neglectful parental care which resulted in
a child who was usually diagnosed by staff as "seriously dis-
turbed".
AN ABUSE INCIDENT INVITES EVALUATION
The state did little regular monitoring of Charity House's
strategic response to the new policy of deinstitutionalization.
What prompted monitoring was a dramatic public crisis: in this
case, an accusation of child abuse within Charity House.
The administrative staff at Charity House had undertaken
the process of training staff and raising the awareness of chil-
dren about sexual abuse. As a result of this intervention, one
young boy reported to his mother that he had been "touched in
that way" by a member of the Charity House staff. The mother
immediately contacted Charity House administrators who
then, according to state-mandated procedures contacted the
appropriate state representatives. Both the state and Charity
House staff initiated procedures either to substantiate or not
substantiate these accusations. (The accused staff person had,
incidently, resigned in the middle of the staff portion of the
training and was no longer working at Charity House.)
As the state investigation proceeded, it became clear that
not only were the accusations founded but that there were a
number of other young boys who had been molested. The
mother of the first boy became agitated by the length of the
investigation procedure. She also felt that the molester would
get away without being punished. As a result, during National
Child Abuse Week she contacted reporters at a local news-
paper. Because of heightened public awareness of the issue of
child abuse, local television stations and newspapers covered
the allegations.
An inevitable snowballing of allegations began. A series of
child abuse allegations were leveled against Charity House by
other parents. All of the complaints were investigated by the
state. Staff and the administration at Charity House were at
first shocked and then angry and depressed by the course of
events. Several line staff resigned. None of the additional alle-
gations were substantiated. The church hierarchy initiated its
own independent investigation of the entire program along
with an assessment of care being provided in other church-
affiliated facilities in the state.
It became clear that Charity House staff were overwhelmed
by the series of misfortunes that the program was experiencing
and appalled by the fact that a staff member had actually sexu-
ally harmed some of the children. Charity House staff also
were not very well prepared for the accountability demanded
by the state.
In several previous instances of institutional abuse, the
state agency administration had sent in an evaluation team to
look at program components after abuse was substantiated.
The state's Deputy Commissioner decided to use such a team
in this case also. Many of the problems that the state team
focused on during their evaluation were closely linked to the
various policy themes that had emerged in child care during
the 1970s and early 1980s. In the concluding analysis particular
attention will be paid here to the way in which certain policy
initiatives interacted and the impact of that interaction on the
effectiveness of the Charity House program.
CONCLUSION: THE "DEINSTITUTIONALIZED"
INSTITUTION
With the conversion to a policy of deinstitutionalization,
the state faced few options about which private vendors would
be called upon to provide services. While a number of privately
owned group homes did emerge during the following decade,
a number of more traditional institutions continued to provide
needed services. As has already been noted, Charity House did
make some adjustments to the new therapeutic milieu: calling
their wings "cottages" and replacing a number of religious
staff. In some ways, however, this shift was superficial. A
number of important policies and practices conflicted with the
therapeutic assumptions that underlie deinstitutionalization.
The use of physical restraint on children, for instance, has
long been an historical problem in institutional settings (Wood-
en, 1976; Hanson, 1982). In part, the policy of deinstitu-
tionalization was a reaction against the philosophy of custodial
control that had been prevalent in child care for over a century.
The state attempted to find a balance between two competing
policies: first, under certain circumstances children would still
need to be restrained, but second, consistent with the thrust of
deinstitutionalization, restraint should be minimized as an in-
tervention. The state established a number of regulations re-
garding the type of restraint that could be used on children and
the length of time that a child could be restrained or placed in
isolation (the ultimate form of restraint) while in residential
care. Because the issue of abuse was a major concern at Charity
House at the time of the evaluation, the state team discussed
the issue with Charity House staff.
It quickly became clear to the outside evaluation team that
the staff at Charity House fell far short of adopting a strategic
response of adjustment and acceptance of a minimal use of
restraint. No firm policy or procedure regulated the use of re-
straints at Charity House. Instead, the use of restraints ap-
peared to be a random and relatively capricious act tied not to
any type of program or policy, but rather to the judgment of
individual staff members.
Clearly there was an "institutional mentality" in operation
at Charity House. The response to children presumed to be
"out of control" provides an illustration of how institutional
assumptions prevailed in this deinstitutionalized setting. Par-
ticularly when "out-of-control" children were in different cot-
tages, staff were faced with two problems: isolation from other
support systems and the fear of contamination (i.e., that other
children would become out-of-control). Neither of these con-
cerns allowed the staff the luxury of assessing the indi-
vidualized treatment needs of the children involved, including
restraint, even though concern with individualized treatment
was a major impetus for changing from an institutional model
of care. The staff appeared trapped in the institutional model of
response.
Undoubtedly the physical environment of Charity House
made it difficult to implement a philosophy of deinstitutionali-
zation. Because of the sheer size of the plant, control and se-
curity became persistent issues. For instance, staff often locked
bedroom doors during the day. At other times, access between
cottages was denied or the large gymnasium was shut off. Be-
cause no policies on these matters existed, the use of control
appeared to be capriciously determined by the judgments of
individual staff members and not tied to any specific treatment
or therapeutic model. The use of physical restraints and other
steps taken by the staff in the interest of control seemed to
undermine the sense of independence and development that
deinstitutionalization was meant to foster.
In addition to the constraints of the physical plant, the
nature of the staff members themselves reflected far more the
old realities of institutionalized settings than the new demands
of a deinstitutionalized therapeutic milieu. While there were a
number of qualified and trained staff members at Charity
House, serious problems nonetheless existed. For instance, the
overnight staff had little or no formal training in the area of
child care. Further, they were regularly excluded from man-
datory in-house training sessions held for daytime staff. The
reasoning behind the hiring choices of overnight staff reflected
an assumption that this staff would serve mainly in a custodial
mode, a mode regularly found in institutional settings on the
overnight shift. The reason given for their lack of in-house
training was scheduling difficulties. But because of these diffi-
culties, this staff became the weak link in creating a therapeutic
environment. This lack of trained night staff unquestionably
weakened Charity House's possible ability to detect early signs
that sexual abuse might be occurring in the institution.
The clinic staff was another group that did not receive
training in the area of sexual abuse and often missed other
training opportunities. For them also, the problem of missing
this specific training was significant. Prior to the substantiation
of sexual abuse, one of the abused children talked with a clinic
nurse over a period of time about having an "itch in my pri-
vates". He was checked for various problems, but nothing be-
came apparent. Abuse was never suspected, although, the
child was probably giving as clear a cue as he could under the
circumstances.
The isolation of any staff group from training creates a
hierarchy of knowledge and skills within a setting, long a crit-
icism of traditional institutional models. This hierarchy causes
alienation, stress, and staff burn-out (Mattingly, 1981). In an
active treatment setting, all staff should be regularly trained-
no shift or type of work should be excluded. The confidant that
a child seeks out in a therapeutic milieu not only should have
specialized knowledge in order to respond immediately to the
child's needs, but also should know how to use other staff to
create a strong supportive environment for the child. This is
the ideal of a deinstitutionalized model. But in reality, direct
service workers who ultimately have the "greatest responsibil-
ity for therapy and greatest functional power for therapy have
the least education and status" (Kadushin, 1980: 614). The
training mode at Charity House was instead more consistent
with a model of care that supposedly had been abandoned with
the coming of deinistitutionalization.
Charity House seemed comfortable with a model more
closely aligned to the assumption of custodial care, punish-
ment and containment treatment. Charity House leadership
seemed unwilling or unable to overcome the institutional iner-
tia that formed the bias toward a punishment/containment
model. At the same time, reliance on untrained custodial night
staff and undertrained clinical day staff followed a care model
which may have been more appropriate, or at least common, in
an institutional setting but this personnel policy served to un-
dermine further the successful implementation of deinstitu-
tionalization.
The mixing of child populations at Charity House, some-
times regardless of age and sex, made it difficult to coordinate
treatment. This mixture was in part a result of the small numbers
of children referred to Charity and their broad range of needs;
the small numbers and broad range of needs related both to the
thrust for deinstitutionalization and to permanency planning.
So the diversity of the youth population affected the provision of
quality care in contradictory ways. The size of the facility called
for regimentation and the therapeutic need of the child called for
individualization (Kadushin, 1980).
At the same time, Charity House administrators could not
afford to operate the program with a large number of beds
empty: the physical plant was too expensive to operate. A re-
spite care program was developed which allowed for children
who lived with their families to spend periodic weekends at
Charity House-this program helped defray operating expens-
es.
At a policy level, deinstitutionalization and respite care ap-
pear highly compatible. At the delivery level the two social
policies came into conflict, creating serious costs for the full
time residents.
The mixing of residents undercut the goals of the therapeu-
tic milieu. Each cottage unit was regularly disrupted by prob-
lem children who were outsiders to the on-going group pro-
cess. This regular disruption also interfered with the
momentum to place children back into their homes or alter-
native adoptive settings. Weekends became a period of time
characterized by a time-out quality, a luxury more typical of a
traditional orphanage model than the ideal deinstitutionalized
system the state had adopted for child care. The mixing of
respite care in this deinstitutionalized setting, then, involved a
response both to a new social policy direction and to the de-
mands of the physical plant to fill empty beds. Little attention
was paid to the manner in which those contradictory policies
would interact at the delivery level and to the adverse impact of
that interaction on the quality of services.
DISCUSSION
Wiseman (1979: 3) has suggested that in order to enhance
our understanding of the process of change that results from
the intervention of social policy, we need to understand "the
divergence of official policy goals and day-to-day operations".
At Charity House, the official goals of deinstitutionalization
and the day-to-day operationalizing of that policy and related
agendas such as permanency planning and child abuse report-
ing procedures were widely divergent. Charity House engaged
in a variety of reactions to the various policy interventions.
While they fell short of open rebellion, a number of reactions-
calling building wings cottages, for instance-amounted to lit-
tle more than coping behavior, while other responses can be
viewed as behavior that either circumvented or inadvertantly
subverted the official policy goals of the state's social service
division. For its part, the state failed to monitor on a regular
basis the response strategies of Charity House to its policy.
And lacking a systematic understanding of how policy was
being operationalized at Charity House, the state could not
fully appreciate the degree to which Charity House was sup-
porting, dealing with, or deflecting the social policies meant to
guide the treatment of children. Only the response to a dramat-
ic crisis allowed the opportunity for such an evaluation.
The case study of Charity House offers an opportunity to
understand more fully how distance can be created between
the official goals of social policy and the daily operationalizing
of that policy. The occurrence of an abuse incident itself should
not be viewed as a sign of a flawed implementation process; the
type of abuse incident described herein can and often does
occur within a variety of therapeutic settings. It is more critical
to understand that a number of aspects inherent in Charity
House's daily operationalizing of policy-the search for con-
trol, the sense of employee isolation, the experience and
knowledge level of key staff, and the mixed client population-
represented a response that fell short of complete acceptance
and adjustment.
To conclude from this examination of the end state of de-
institutionalization at Charity House that the policy itself
failed, however, overlooks the dynamics of change at Charity
House. What failed to check some of the chronic problems at
Charity House including abuse was not the failure of any one
such policy initiative, but rather Charity House's failure to ad-
just adequately to the new social policy thrust: allowing instead
for the old custodial/containment model of treatment to linger.
The state shares responsibility for its failure to monitor Charity
House's daily response and to assure proper adjustment and
compliance. The state itself inadvertently abetted in circum-
venting response to appropriate policy initiatives by its deci-
sion to implement a significant portion of the deinstitu-
tionalization thrust, especially as it related to children, within
existing institutional environments. While efforts were made to
adapt the institutional milieu to a deinstitutionalized
therapeutic environment, those efforts tended to be superficial
rather than programmatic and systematic. Deinstitutionaliza-
tion and its related children's policies did not fail on their own
terms; they were undermined by the persistence of the pre-
vious model of child care.
The confusion surrounding the reevaluation of deinstitu-
tionalization as a social policy points to another key conclusion.
Because policies often are created in response to environmental
changes or in reaction to specific implementation problems and
often by separate government agencies, they rarely are ap-
proached in a holistic, systematic manner (Finsterbusch, 1980).
But the manner in which the myriad social policies interact
both between themselves and with the external environment is
essential to the understanding and evaluation of those policies.
A partial or fragmented understanding of social policy imple-
mentation can lead to a seriously flawed understanding of the
dynamics of implementation. In turn, that misunderstanding
can, and often does, have serious implications in the future
direction of social policy. It is critical, then, both in terms of
analysis and the quality of services provided by the policy-
making agencies, to avoid such an analytical fallacy.
The case study of policy at the delivery level becomes an
irreplaceable tool in achieving a systematic understanding of
the process of policy implementation and institutionalization.
Such an approach allows social scientists to analyze the interac-
tion of myriad forces that make up an applied policy and, as in
the case of Charity House, track unanticipated consequences
(Merton, 1936). When combined with a utilization-focused
evaluation of a particular action setting, social scientists are
offered the opportunity to move beyond the research stage to
becoming what Wiseman (1979) has referred to as active agents
of social change.
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